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EXCLAMATIONS AS A "FIRMLY ROOTED"
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
Stanley A. Goldman*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ohio v. Roberts' the Supreme Court of the United States con-
cluded that the Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution demands that hearsay from a declarant who
has not been confronted by the party against whom the hearsay is di-
rected must possess adequate "indicia of reliability" before the hearsay
may be used against a criminal defendant.2 The Roberts Court further
found that sufficient "indicia of reliability" under the Confrontation
Clause can be "inferred" if the hearsay statement falls within a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception. 3 Thus, hearsay falling within such an excep-
tion presumptively possesses sufficient indicia of reliability to be constitu-
tionally admissible.4
With respect to which hearsay exceptions qualify as "firmly rooted,"
the Court stated that "certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them com-
ports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.' "I In other
words, those exceptions satisfying this general standard can properly be
classified as "firmly rooted." On the other hand, if the hearsay does not
fall within this general standard, the Court has reasoned that it still may
be constitutionally admissible if the prosecution can establish that the
statement was made under circumstances involving "particularized guar-
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A. 1972, University of Califor-
nia at Los Angeles, J.D. 1975, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
2. Id. at 73. See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970). For a general discussion of the hearsay rule, see C. MCCORMICK, MC-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 244-53, at 724-58 (3d ed. 1984). The sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI.
3. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
4. Id. at 73. For an extensive discussion of the "firmly rooted" exception, see Goldman,
Not So "Firmly Rooted" Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1987).
5. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895))
(emphasis added).
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antees of trustworthiness.",6
In a footnote, the Roberts Court offered four examples of "firmly
rooted" hearsay exceptions: (1) previously cross-examined former testi-
mony; (2) properly administered business records; (3) properly adminis-
tered public records; and (4) dying declarations.7 The Roberts Court's
discussion reveals that these four exceptions were not intended to be the
only exceptions classifiable as "firmly rooted".' For example, in recent
years the Court has added the co-conspirator exception to the list of
"firmly rooted" exceptions.9 Even so, not all traditionally recognized
hearsay exceptions fall within the category of "firmly rooted." Had the
Court believed that all traditional hearsay exceptions were "firmly
rooted," presumably it would have said so. Thus, additions to the list of
"firmly rooted" exceptions must be made on a case by case basis.
In addition to the Supreme Court, lower courts may also classify
additional hearsay exceptions as "firmly rooted." Following Roberts,
lower federal and state courts have found several other exceptions wor-
thy of such classification.10 This Article will examine a recent trend by
some lower courts to add the spontaneous exclamation exception to the
list of "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. This Article posits that many
out of court assertions admitted under the spontaneous exclamation ex-
ception are not made under sufficiently reliable circumstances to warrant
a presumption in favor of their constitutionality.
II. EXPANDING THE LIST OF "FIRMLY ROOTED"
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Lower courts are in dispute as to which criteria properly qualify an
exception as "firmly rooted." For example, some courts have equated
"firmly rooted" with "long established." 1 These courts reason that if an
6. Id.
7. Id. at 66 n.8. For a general discussion of the hearsay exceptions that the Supreme
Court has classified as "firmly rooted," see Goldman, supra note 4, at 11-26.
8. This becomes apparent upon examination of certain parts of the opinion. See, e.g.,
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
9. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987). For a general discussion of co-
conspirator statements, see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 267, at 792-94.
10. See, e.g., Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1297 (1988) (spontaneous exclamation is "firmly rooted" hearsay exception); State v. Mar-
shall, 113 Wis. 2d 643, 335 N.W.2d 612 (1983) (adoptive admissions exception is "firmly
rooted"). For a further discussion of these cases see Goldman, supra note 4, at 26-39.
11. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Vinzant, 522 F.2d 448, 450 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1037 (1975) (excited utterance is long-standing exception to hearsay rule); People v. Nieves, 67
N.Y.2d 125, 131, 492 N.E.2d 109, 112, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1986) (court favored well-estab-
lished reliance on specific categories of hearsay exceptions rather than amorphous "reliability"
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exception has survived the test of time, any statement falling within the
exception should be presumptively constitutional.12 The proponents of
this position find support in Bourjaily v. United States,13 where the
United States Supreme Court found the co-conspirator hearsay exception
to be "firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence" so as to qualify as a
firmly rooted exception. 4 The majority opinion supported this conclu-
sion with the fact that co-conspirator's statements have been a recog-
nized hearsay exception since 1827.15
Though this language in Bourjaily could be read as support for
equating firmly rooted with "long established,"1 6 such a conclusion
would mean that the Confrontation Clause is controlled by factors hav-
ing little to do with the purpose of the clause itself. Rather, the applica-
tion of the clause would be governed by what often amounts to little
more than the historical accident of early recognition, even if founded
upon an erroneous rationale.
A more reasoned analysis demands that longevity alone should not
provide the basis for establishing a statement's compliance with the man-
dates of the Confrontation Clause. The classification of an exception as
firmly rooted should depend on whether the requirements of that excep-
tion guarantee the reliability of "virtually any" hearsay falling within the
exception.17 Any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the Confrontation Clause as identified by the United States
Supreme Court. 8
As noted by a Wisconsin state court,19 "the question of whether a
hearsay exception is firmly rooted does not turn upon how long the rule
has been accepted but rather how solidly it is grounded on considerations
of reliability and trustworthiness-the very reasons for the right to con-
test); State v. Dorsey, 103 Wis. 2d 152, 163, 307 N.W.2d 612, 617 (1981) (citing Baker v. Stat6,
80 Wis. 416, 420, 50 N.W. 518, 520 (1891) (recognizing well-established admissibility of state-
ments of co-conspirator).
12. See, e.g., Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]o the extent that a
traditional hearsay exception has sufficiently long and sturdy roots, a determination that the
exception applies obviates the need for a separate assessment of the indicia of reliability."),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1297 (1988). However, despite the language in the Puleio decision, the
court proceeded to examine the spontaneous exclamation in question for its reliability after
determining that it qualified as a firmly rooted exception. Id. at 1207.
13. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
14. Id. at 183.
15. Id. (citing United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827)).
16. See id.
17. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 244 (1895)).
18. Id. See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970).
19. State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985).
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frontation."z An out of court assertion may satisfy the requirements of
a long-observed hearsay exception, yet not necessarily possess sufficient
reliability to meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
In Dutton v. Evans,2' the United States Supreme Court provided
four factors to help measure "indicia of reliability. '2 2 As provided in
Dutton, hearsay has a greater likelihood of being trustworthy when: (1)
the out of court statement does not contain an express assertion about a
past fact; (2) the possibility is extremely remote that the out of court
statement is founded on a faulty recollection; (3) the circumstances under
which the statement was made indicate that the declarant is not misrep-
resenting the facts; and (4) the declarant has personal knowledge of the
matters asserted in the statement.23 While compliance with these factors
cannot absolutely guarantee reliability, the Dutton Court concluded that
their presence at least increases the likelihood of trustworthiness.2"
This author has previously suggested that, based upon the Court's
holdings in Dutton and Ohio v. Roberts,25 an exception should be classi-
fied as firmly rooted only if it meets one of two tests: (1) the exception
guarantees that the accused is given a meaningful opportunity in the past
or present to question the hearsay declarant; or (2) that the requirements
of the exception realistically assure that virtually any statement offered
under it is based on personal knowledge and is not the product of either
faulty recollection, or intentional or unintentional misrepresentation.26
Only those exceptions that satisfy one of these tests guarantee the relia-
bility of "virtually any" hearsay falling within them. Many spontaneous
exclamations are not made under sufficiently reliable circumstances to
satisfy either of the tests; therefore, they should not be classified as a
firmly rooted hearsay exception.
III. SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS SHOULD NOT BE CLASSIFIED
AS FIRMLY ROOTED
One of the hearsay exceptions that some lower courts have classified
20. Id. at 709-10, 370 N.W.2d at 759.
21. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
22. Id. at 88-89. The plurality in Dutton concluded that "the mission of the Confrontation
Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in
criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the




25. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
26. See Goldman, supra note 4, at 46.
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as firmly rooted is the spontaneous exclamation exception, also known as
the excited utterance exception.27 Federal courts of appeals for the
First,28 Sixth,29 and Seventh 0 Circuits, the court of appeal for the Dis-
trict of Columbia,31 as well as state courts in Arizona,32 North Carolina33
and South Dakota34 have all determined this exception to be "firmly
rooted."
The First Circuit's decision in Puleio v. Vose, a5 is the most recent
illustration of a federal circuit court's approach to this issue. Appellant
Puleio had been convicted of first-degree murder in a Massachusetts state
court. 6 It had been alleged that during an argument in a bar the accused
had pulled a gun and fired a shot which had missed the intended victim
and instead had killed a bystander.3 7 At the trial, Puleio and his wit-
nesses testified that he was not the one who had fired the fatal shot. 8
One of the prosecution's witnesses was the bartender who had been
working the night of the shooting. 9 She had not witnessed the alterca-
tion, but had heard the shot and immediately asked those present if any-
one had seen who fired the fatal shot.4 Over defense objection, she was
allowed to testify that the defendant's brother's girlfriend, who did not
testify at the trial, identified the defendant, Joe Puleio, as the shooter.41
The admission of this hearsay statement under the state's "spontaneous
utterance" exception became a primary basis for Puleio's state appeal
and for a subsequent federal writ of habeas corpus.
27. For a general discussion of spontaneous exclamations, see 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1745-64, at 191-247 (Chadburn rev. ed. 1976).
28. Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1297
(1988).
29. Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071
(1984).
30. United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1986).
31. Harrison v. United States, 435 A.2d 734, 736 (D.C. 1981).
32. State v. Yslas, 139 Ariz. 60, 65, 676 P.2d 1118, 1123 (1984); State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz.
404, 419, 661 P.2d 1105, 1120, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
33. State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 696-97, 281 S.E.2d 377, 388 (1981).
34. State v. Bawdon, 386 N.W.2d 484, 487 (S.D. 1986). See also McLaughlin v. Vinzant,
522 F.2d 448, 450-51 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975) (excited utterance is long
standing exception to hearsay rule and does not contravene Confrontation Clause); Harmon v.
Anderson, 495 F. Supp. 341, 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (excited utterance is reliable and long-
established exception to hearsay rule); People v. Grover, 116 Ill. App. 3d 116, 121,451 N.E.2d
587, 591 (1983) (excited utterance exception bears sufficient indicia of reliability).
35. 830 F.2d 1197 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1297 (1988).
36. Id. at 1199.
37. Commonwealth v. Puleio, 394 Mass. 101, 102, 474 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (1985).
38. Id.
39. Puleio, 830 F.2d at 1203.
40. Id.
41. Commonwealth v. Puleio, 394 Mass. at 104, 474 N.E.2d at 1081.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the trial
judge had not abused his discretion in classifying the disputed out of
court assertion as falling within the state's spontaneous utterance excep-
tion.42 Agreeing with this ruling, the First Circuit additionally found
that the admission of the statement had not violated the defendant's con-
stitutional right to confrontation of witnesses.4 3 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the federal court specifically held the spontaneous exclamation
exception to be firmly rooted.' The court based its conclusion on the
"long and storied lineage of the exception." 45 The court noted English
roots dating from the end of the 17th century and American origins that
could be traced as far back as the latter-middle 1800s. 46
As noted earlier in this Article, it is a mistake to equate firmly
rooted with "long existing."'47 Though the spontaneous exclamation ex-
ception may have a "long and storied lineage," it cannot be said that it
rests upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evi-
dence within it comports with the "substance of the constitutional pro-
tection."4 In order to understand the trustworthiness problems that can
arise with respect to statements offered under the spontaneous exclama-
tion exception, it is necessary to analyze the reliability of the exception's
procedural safeguards.
IV. THE RELIABILITY OF SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS
Hearsay admitted under the spontaneous exclamation exception is
believed to be credible for three reasons. First, such statements express
an immediate perception unhampered by the potential blurrings and fad-
ings of memory.49 Second, the contemporaneous nature of the remarks
provides insufficient time for fabrication." Third, the declarant uttered
the hearsay while in the throes of excitement caused by having witnessed
a startling event.51 As a result, the statement is said to accurately de-
42. Id. at 105, 474 N.E.2d at 1081.
43. Puleio, 830 F.2d at 1207.
44. Id. at 1206.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Court specifically cited Bourjaily in support of its use of this longevity analy-
sis. Id. (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987)).
47. See supra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
48. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 244 (1895)).
49. J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 1705(b), at 202-03.
50. Id. See also Foster, Present Sense Impressions: An Analysis and Proposal, 10 Loy. U.
CHi. L.J. 299, 317-18 (1979).
51. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 297, at 855 (in order for the exception
to apply "there must be an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the
[Vol. 23:453
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scribe the observed event. However, upon closer examination these ra-
tionales appear to be based upon questionable psychological assump-
tions.
The first rationale is inherently flawed in that it depends completely
on the assumption that descriptive accuracy is a natural consequence of
immediate observation, and that this accurate observation is preserved by
a contemporaneous statement. 2 In the absence of other reliability-insur-
ing factors, nearness in time has never provided the sole basis for justify-
ing the creation of an exception to the hearsay rule. Rather, it is the
spontaneous or almost spontaneous reaction to the event described in the
declarant's statement, that is said to give these statements reliability.
Thus, the fact that the out of court statement was made nearer in time to
the event than the witness' trial testimony is not the reason for the exist-
ence of this exception. 3 Even so, this assumption is rarely warranted.
After considerable study, authorities in the field have found that the ac-
curacy of an individual's perception of an event may vary widely as a
result of an infinite number of potential variables. 4
"The cognitive processes of the human organism are not the
equivalent of a photographic process which renders and preserves an es-
sentially accurate counterpart of some event."55 Cognitive powers sim-
ply do not operate in a vacuum. When dealing with any description, "it
is virtually impossible to ascertain whether the utterance is generated by
the episode observed or by operation of the declarant's mental processes,
even where the declaration is emitted virtually instantaneously upon cog-
normal reflective thought processes"); J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, §§ 1747, 1749, at 195, 199
(" '[S]pecial trustworthiness' arises from the fact that in the stress of nervous excitement the
reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere
expression of [the witness'] actual impressions and belief.").
52. For a discussion of the psychological concept of the "logical completion mechanism,"
which results in unconsciously distorted perceptions, see A. TRANKELL, RELIABILITY:
METHODS FOR ANALYZING AND ASSESSING WITNESS STATEMENTS 18 (1972). See also gen-
erally Buckhout, Psychology and Eyewitness Identification, 2 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 75
(1976); Lezak, Some Psychological Limitations on Witness Reliability, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 117
(1973).
53. See supra note 51.
54. Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and The Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 21. Stewart concludes:
The degree of correspondence between the testimony of an event and the reality it
purports to represent may, therefore, vary widely according to the effect of numerous
factors. The imperatives of successful adaptation do not require that the individual's
cognitive process operate in all instances to provide information having the degree of
objective accuracy necessary for accurate, after-the-fact reconstruction which is at-
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nizance of the event. Yet it is speed which usually forms the crux of the
spontaneity requirement.,
56
When an individual perceives an event, he or she is subjectively se-
lective as to which external signals to process. 7 He or she then takes
those signals and reorganizes them into a sequence that, though subjec-
tively acceptable, may bear only "a tenuous relationship" to the actual
event observed.5 "Thus, even elimination of the hearsay risk of flawed
memory provides scant assurance that the declarant's perceptual acuity
operated at the time in question to produce anything more than an idio-
syncratic image bearing only slight relationship to objective reality."' 59
Though spontaneity may result in less opportunity for the declarant's
memory to fade, that does not affect the possibility that the event in ques-
tion may have been inaccurately observed.
60
The second rationale, that the declarant has insufficient time to
fabricate,61 is subject to similar attack. Empirical psychological studies
do confirm that the danger of fabrication is decreased where only a mat-
ter of seconds or fractions of seconds separate a particular event and an
individual's description of that event.62 However, once the number of
seconds has increased even slightly, the reliability of the description is
substantially reduced. 63 Thus, the hearsay statement would have to be
spoken virtually simultaneously with the described event for even the
slightest assurance of increased reliability."
Furthermore, the second rationale has two inherent flaws. First,
spontaneity is not easily measured after the fact. Commentators cite to
psychological studies indicating that the interval which separates cogni-
tion from the onset of the capacity to fabricate is brief-often a matter of
fractions of seconds-and impossible to gauge without the aid of instru-
ments.65 Second, despite these problems, courts nonetheless tend to be
56. Foster, supra note 50, at 325-26.
57. Id. at 328.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 329. See A. TRANKELL, supra note 52, at 18-20; Marshall, Evidence, Psychology,
and the Trial: Some Challenges to Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 197, 207-08 (1963).
60. As one author has noted, "even where the contemporaneity requirement is strictly
applied, mere speed, as an aspect of spontaneity, at best renders the veracity of a response more
likely, but not a certitude." Foster, supra note 50, at 326.
61. Id. at 325.
62. Id. at 315; see also Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 432, 436-37 (1928). See generally Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity and
the Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204 (1960).
63. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 62, at 437-38 & nn.27-37.
64. Id. at 436-37.
65. See id. at 437; see also Stewart, supra note 54, at 8-22.
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very lenient in the amount of time permitted to pass between the observa-
tion and the contemporaneous or spontaneous statement.66 Commenta-
tors have observed that "[f]rom the point of view of subjective veracity,
the speed the courts demand does not necessarily guarantee truth., 67 In
some instances, spontaneous exclamations have been admitted even when
made several minutes or several hours after the event described.68
If the empirical data is believed, the interval between event and de-
scription typically permitted by courts renders the reliability of state-
ments admitted under the spontaneous exclamation exception dubious.
Plainly,
excitement exaggerates, sometimes grossly, distortion in per-
ception and memory especially when the observer is a witness
to a non-routine, episodic event such as occurs in automobile
collision cases and crimes. The likelihood of inaccurate percep-
tion, the drawing of inferences to fill in memory gaps, and the
reporting of nonfacts is high .... Yet in Wigmore's view an
excited utterance is such a superior quality of evidence that the
declarant need not testify even though available-"a proposi-
tion never disputed." In fact, the theory is merely an artifice
for the admission of highly unreliable evidence which is often
the only type of evidence available. No justification exists for
foregoing cross-examination and admitting such evidence if the
declarant is available.6 9
Finally, the trustworthiness of spontaneous exclamations is said to
be bolstered by the fact that the declarant has uttered the hearsay state-
ment while in the throes of excitement caused by having witnessed a star-
66. See, e.g., United States v. Golden, 671 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir.) (excited utterance
statement made 15 minutes after assault held admissible), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982);
United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 1979) (present sense impression held
admissible when spoken after 23 minutes); Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co., 578 F.2d 422, 426
n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (excited utterance statement made 15 to 45 minutes after accident held
admissible); McCurdy v. Greyhound Corp., 346 F.2d 224, 225-26 (3d Cir. 1965) (excited utter-
ance statement made 15 minutes after accident held admissible); People v. Jones, 155 Cal.
App. 3d 653, 661-62, 202 Cal. Rptr. 289, 294-95 (1984) (statement made 30 to 40 minutes after
being severely burned admissible); State v. Stafford, 237 Iowa 780, 786-88, 23 N.W.2d 832, 836
(1946) (excited utterance statement made 14 hours after beating held admissible). But see
Hamilton v. Missouri Petroleum Prods. Co., 438 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Mo. 1969) (excited utter-
ance statement made 25 minutes after accident held inadmissible); Bowman v. Barnes, 168 W.
Va. 111, 127-28, 282 S.E.2d 613, 622-23 (1981) (statement made 44 minutes after collision held
inadmissable as excited utterance). See also Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 62, at 432-33.
67. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 62, at 439.
68. See supra note 66.
69. Stewart, supra note 54, at 28-29 (quoting, in part, 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1748
(3d ed. 1970)).
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tling event.7" Theoretically, the excitement eliminates the witness'
capacity to reflect, thus precluding the ability to fabricate and ensuring
an accurate, reliable description of the event perceived.71 However,
while strong emotion may negate the power to fabricate, it may also dis-
tort the ability to observe or recall, and thereby reduce the trustworthi-
ness of the declarant's account.72
"One need not be a psychologist to distrust an observation made
under emotional stress; everyone accepts such statements with mental
reservation. '73 "What the emotion gains by way of overcoming the de-
sire to lie, it loses by impairing the declarant's power of observation.
'74
Thus, the more startling the event, and the greater the emotional reac-
tion, the less likely the declarant's observation will be accurate.
In their evaluation of this dilemma, Professors Hutchins and
Slesinger concluded that the existence of this paradox left the spontane-
ous exclamation hearsay exception with no justification.75 In fact,
Hutchins and Slesinger concluded that "[o]n psychological grounds, the
rule might very well read: Hearsay is inadmissible, especially (not ex-
cept) if it be a spontaneous exclamation."
'76
On the other hand, it could be argued that this danger of inaccuracy
or misperception is inevitable and irreducible, even if the declarant is
required to testify to the event observed, because testimony of the actual
event would incorporate the same perceptual errors which stem from the
original observation. Furthermore, if the witness testifies to what he or
she saw, there is the danger that the witness' memory may have faded
since the event. Thus, a statement made at or soon after the event oc-
curred may be just as reliable, or as unreliable, as the witness' present
testimony.
This analysis, however, misses not only the very reason for the exist-
ence of the hearsay rule but also an arguable rationale for the confronta-
tion clause. The rule was created out of a belief that the reliability risk
inherent in all eyewitness testimony may be reduced through in-court
cross-examination, wherein any errors of perception or fabrications can
be revealed. No such cross-examination takes place when the trier of fact
is allowed to consider the truth of an out of court assertion admitted
70. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 62, at 435-36.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 437-38.
73. Id. at 437.
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under the spontaneous exclamation exception.77
In sum, the spontaneous exclamation exception fails to comply with
the trustworthiness factors delineated in Dutton v. Evans7" requiring that
the out of court statement be based on an accurate recollection of the
event and made under circumstances that ensure the declarant did not
intentionally or unintentionally misrepresent the event.7 9
Contrary to the conclusion of lower courts in such cases as Puleio v.
Vose, s° the spontaneous exclamation exception should not qualify as
firmly rooted. In light of the persistent flaws underlying the spontaneous
exclamation exception, we may not conclude with reasonable assurance
that virtually any hearsay admissible under the spontaneous exclamation
exception has been made under circumstances which inherently guaran-
tee the absence of intentional fabrication or distortion at the time of the
initial observation or in the ability to recall the event as observed.
V. ONLY A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IS
CREATED BY CLASSIFYING A STATEMENT AS FALLING
WITHIN A FIRMLY ROOTED EXCEPTION
An additional danger lurks in classifying exceptions, like the sponta-
neous exclamations exception, as firmly rooted. Ohio v. Roberts"l cre-
ated two presumptions concerning the constitutionally permissible use of
hearsay against criminal defendants. The first presumption is one of con-
stitutional inadmissibility when the out of court assertion does not fall
77. The potential for admitting unreliable spontaneous exclamations is best illustrated by
the fact that the anonymity of the declarant is not a bar to admission under either exception.
See FED. R. EVID. 803(l)-(2). The dangers presented by the admission of a hearsay statement
of an anonymous declarant are described by Weinstein and Berger:
[T]he remarks of a bystander and even of an unidentified bystander are admissible,
provided the requirements of the exception are met .... If the declarant, though a
bystander, is identified, it may be possible to place him at the scene so that a judge
could find it reasonable to infer perception. If he is unidentified, his capacity to
observe can neither be substantiated nor attacked ....
... [T]he court's suspicion of the witness' testimony may lead it to find that the
declarant's perception was not established. On the other hand, it may conclude that
since the witness can be cross-examined, the question of his credibility and the de-
rived credibility of the declarant's statement, are matters which can safely be left to
the jury. Much depends on the type of case, the availability of other evidence, the
verifying details in the statement, and the setting in which the statement is made.
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE 803(1)[01], at 803-77 to -79 (1989) (footnotes
omitted).
78. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
79. Id. at 88-89.
80. 830 F.2d 1197, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1297 (1988).
81. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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within a firmly rooted exception. 2 The United States Supreme Court
has held that this presumption is rebutted when the prosecution is able to
establish that the hearsay was spoken under circumstances with "partic-
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness." s
The second presumption is that the statement is constitutionally ad-
missible when the hearsay falls within a firmly rooted exception.8 4 Thus,
classifying a hearsay statement as falling within a firmly rooted exception
means that the statement presumptively satisfies the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause." Logic would seem to dictate that this second
presumption should also be rebutted if the defendant establishes lack of
an adequate opportunity to question the declarant, and that the particu-
82. Id. at 66 (prosecution can rebut this presumption if it can establish that statement was
made under circumstances with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"). See also
Goldman, supra note 4, at 7 n.27.
83. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The rebuttable nature of this presumption was recently reaf-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 (1986).
84. Some lower courts have classified certain exceptions as firmly rooted but, nevertheless,
have examined the trustworthiness of the particular statement at issue. Exceptions treated in
this manner by courts include adoptive admissions, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); former testi-
mony, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); declarations against interest, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); excited
utterance, FED. R. EvID. 803(2); and present sense impressions, FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
For example, in State v. Bauer, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that while the infer-
ence in favor of the reliability of a firmly rooted exception is strong,
evidence falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception is not admissible per se.
The trial court must still examine each case to determine whether there are unusual
circumstances which may warrant exclusion of the evidence. If no such unusual
circumstance exists, the evidence may properly be admitted. "Where unusual cir-
cumstances are apparent, the court may have reason to inquire into whether a mean-
ingful confrontation was indeed afforded a defendant."
109 Wis. 2d 204, 215, 325 N.W.2d 857, 862 (1982) (quoting Nabbefeld v. State, 83 Wis. 2d
515, 527, 266 N.W.2d 292, 298 (1978)), vacated on other grounds, 127 Wis. 2d 125, 377
N.W.2d 175 (1985).
Similarly, in State v. Buelow, the court noted that "[w]hen the evidence fits within a
firmly-rooted hearsay exception, reliability can be inferred and the evidence is generally admis-
sible. While the inference of reliability is strong, the court must still examine each case to
determine whether there are unusual circumstances which warrant exclusion of the evidence."
122 Wis. 2d 465, 479, 363 N.W.2d 255, 263 (1984) (citing State v. Curbello-Rodriguez, 119
Wis. 2d 414, 430, 351 N.W.2d 758, 766 (1984)); Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 215, 325 N.W.2d at 863.
In Brown v. Tard, the hearsay offered by the prosecution qualified as a present sense
impression, and the court concluded that, for Confrontation Clause purposes, its reliability
could be inferred. 552 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (D.N.J. 1982). In spite of this presumption, how-
ever, the court examined the statement itself to determine whether it bore sufficient "circum-
stantial guarantees of reliability" to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Id.; see also Haggins v.
Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1071 (1984) (although statements of four-year-old molestation victim "fit squarely within the
parameters of a well-recognized and firmly-rooted hearsay exception," court noted factors
which guaranteed trustworthiness of statements); State v. Marshall, 113 Wis. 2d 643, 655-56,
335 N.W.2d 612, 617-18 (1983) (court examined indicia of reliability of adoptive admission in
question, even though it qualified as firmly rooted hearsay exception).
85. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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lar hearsay offered against the defendant was spoken under untrustwor-
thy circumstances.
Unfortunately, as a result of the Supreme Court's lack of clarity
with respect to the rebuttable nature of this latter presumption, some
lower courts have treated the presumptively constitutional status of hear-
say offered under a firmly rooted exception as if it were conclusive.
86
Once these courts conclude that a hearsay statement falls within a firmly
rooted exception, they deem it to have irrebuttably satisfied the demands
of the Confrontation Clause and permit no constitutional challenge as to
the lack of trustworthiness of the particular statement.87 One sentence in
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Bouraily v. United States88
may arguably support this position.
In Bouraily, the Supreme Court stated that "the Confrontation
Clause does not require a court to embark on an independent inquiry
into the reliability of statements that satisfy the requirements of [a firmly
rooted exception]."' 89 To the extent the Court intended this sentence to
mean that all hearsay falling within such an exception conclusively satis-
fies the demands of confrontation, such a conclusion would be unwar-
ranted and dangerous. Although other Supreme Court opinions have
never explicitly stated that this second presumption is rebuttable, that
conclusion extends logically from the Court's underlying call for
reliability. 90
86. See United States v. Chindawongse, 771 F.2d 840, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) requirements are "identical to the requirements for admissibility
under the confrontation clause"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1085 (1986); United States v. Lurz,
666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) allowed admis-
sion of statements by co-conspirator; hence Confrontation Clause was not violated), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 843 (1982); United States v: Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349-51 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983); Harrison v. United States, 435 A.2d 734, 736 (D.C. 1981); State v.
Bawdon, 386 N.W.2d 484, 487 (S.D. 1986). See also United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836
n.3 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he confrontation clause presents no bar to the use of 6xtrajudicial
statements of a co-conspirator .. "); Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir.
1972) (co-conspirators' statements admissible under recognized exception and satisfy require-
ments of Confrontation Clause), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128 (1973); People v. Maxwell, 209
Cal. App. 3d 635, 644, 257 Cal. Rptr. 439, 444 (1989), review denied, and ordered not to be
officially published by the California Supreme Court, July 13, 1989.
87. See Chindawongse, 771 F.2d at 847; Harrison, 435 A.2d at 736; Bawdon, 386 N.W.2d
at 487.
88. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
89. Id. at 183-84.
90. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). Holding this latter presumption conclusive
poses a significant constitutional danger: A conclusive presumption would forever preclude
an accused from arguing that the hearsay admitted against him was made under circumstances
so unreliable as to deny the right to confrontation of witnesses.
Not all statements admissible under a particular hearsay exception possess the same de-
gree of trustworthiness and reliability. Two statements admissible under the same exception
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The plurality opinion in Roberts illustrates the rebuttable nature of
the presumption that a statement falling within a firmly rooted exception
satisfies the Confrontation Clause. In spite of the plurality's opinion that
the hearsay statement involved in Roberts was offered under a firmly
rooted exception, the Justices nonetheless found it necessary to examine
the particular circumstances in which the exception had been applied.9
Thus, rather than being deemed conclusive, this presumption should be
rebutted whenever it can be established that under the specific facts of a
case the hearsay offered against the defendant was sufficiently untrust-
worthy so as to offend the degree of reliability demanded by the Confron-
tation Clause.
92
In Puleio v. Vose,93 for example, the First Circuit made it clear that
the inquiry into the reliability of the out of court assertion used against a
criminal defendant did not end simply because the statement technically
satisfied the statutory requirements of a firmly rooted exception.94
[We] stop short of holding that a federal court... need make
no inquiry whatever into the dependability of excited utterance
testimony. Plainly, the mere fact that a state court, in admit-
ting evidence, tucks it into a pigeonhole which bears the label of
a time-honored hearsay exception cannot be entirely disposi-
tive .... Thus, the state court record must show a sufficient
factual predicate rationally to support the affixation of the
label. 95
Thus, the First Circuit opined that the classification of firmly rooted
creates a rebuttable presumption that such statements satisfy the consti-
tutional requirements of confrontation. This presumption can be rebut-
ted by a defense showing that the particular statement at issue, which
technically falls within the definition of such an exception, may still not
be reliable enough to satisfy the dictates of confrontation.
The Puleio court found the standard of reliability "ha[d] been met in
the case at bar," and that "[t]here was ample evidence before the trial
can boast substantially different levels of trustworthiness depending on the self-serving nature
of their content. For example, assume a jurisdiction labels spontaneous exclamations as firmly
rooted. A spontaneous exclamation favorable to the interests of the declarant made moments
after an automobile accident may not possess the same degree of reliability as an exclamation
acknowledging the declarant's own liability.
91. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67-68; see also C. WHITEBREAD & S. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE 678 (2d ed. 1986).
92. See Goldman, supra note 4, at 47.
93. 830 F.2d 1197 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1297 (1988).
94. Id. at 1207.
95. Id.
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court to allow the admission of [the declarant's] statement.., under the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule."96 Other courts, how-
ever, have seemingly concluded that no such additional inquiry will ever
be needed once a statement has been held to fall within the spontaneous
exclamation exception.97
The reliability of a statement is not guaranteed simply because it
falls within a firmly rooted exception. The general standard created by
the Supreme Court itself provides that "virtually any" statement offered
under a firmly rooted exception will comport with the Confrontation
Clause.98 The use of the term "virtually any" would appear to acknowl-
edge that some statements admissible under firmly rooted exceptions will
not comport with constitutional requirements. Apparently, the Roberts
Court did not intend to deny defendants the opportunity to establish that
the particular hearsay statement offered against them was unreliable,
even though it was offered under such an exception.
If this presumption of trustworthiness is conclusive, it forecloses de-
fendants from meritoriously arguing a violation of their constitutional
rights, for it prohibits them from demonstrating the untrustworthiness of
the particular hearsay offered by the prosecution. Under these circum-
stances, some defendants will potentially be given no more than a ritual-
istic trial-a trial with the deck constitutionally stacked against them.99
Given the possibility that courts may increasingly choose to categorize
the constitutionality of a statement offered under a firmly rooted hearsay
exception as an irrebuttable presumption, care in so classifying an excep-
tion becomes even more important; it points to yet another potential dan-
ger in classifying the spontaneous exclamation exception as firmly
rooted.
VI. SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS
The confusion over categorizing the spontaneous exclamation ex-
ception as firmly rooted can be illustrated by the state of the law in Cali-
96. Id.
97. See People v. Maxwell, 209 Cal. App. 3d 635, 644, 257 Cal. Rptr. 439, 444 (1989);
Harrison v. United States, 435 A.2d 734, 736 (D.C. 1981); State v. Bawdon, 386 N.W.2d 484,
487 (S.D. 1986).
98. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
99. The Due Process Clause guarantees more than just a ritualistic trial. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1979). In Jackson, the Court concluded that the Due Process
Clause of the Federal Constitution barred criminal conviction without proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. Id. at 315. A conviction that is the result of a procedurally correct trial may
nonetheless violate due process if the evidence used to support the conviction is unreliable. See
id. at 317.
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fornia. Only one published California opinion has discussed the
spontaneous exclamation exception as firmly rooted. In a footnote in In
re Damon H.,'I a California Court of Appeal commented that although
it was of the opinion that this exception satisfied the requirements set
forth in Ohio v. Roberts1"' for classification as firmly rooted, the court
would nevertheless analyze "the 'particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness' which must be provided when no such exception is involved"
when deciding whether appellant's constitutional rights had been vio-
lated."0 2 Based on this analysis, the court found that the spontaneous
exclamation admitted against the appellant at trial had not violated the
Confrontation Clause.
10 3
More recently, in People v. Maxwell,"° a different California Court
of Appeal was faced with appellant's argument that his trial counsel's
failure to raise a Confrontation Clause objection to the admission of an
incriminating spontaneous declaration had rendered trial counsel's per-
formance constitutionally ineffective. 105
Maxwell had been charged with several counts of sexual assault aris-
ing out of a brief incident outside of an apartment where he had been
attending a party. 10 6 During the assault, the victim managed to sound
the horn of her truck, which was parked near the site of the attack.
1 7
The assailant fled when two men, both of whom knew the appellant,
emerged from their apartment in response to the sound of the horn. 1 8
Neither of these two men testified at trial. However, a third individual,
who arrived at the scene after the assailant had fled, did testify.0 9 Part
of this third person's testimony was that she asked one of the two men
what had happened and he excitedly responded that "he had chased him
[appellant Jeff Maxwell] for two blocks," but that he could not catch
him.
110
At trial, appellant denied the attack, denied he had been chased by
anyone and argued that the alleged out of court declarant did not like
100. 165 Cal. App. 3d 471, 211 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1985).
101. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
102. Damon H., 165 Cal. App. 3d at 478 n.8, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 627 n.8.
103. Id. at 478, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
104. 209 Cal. App. 3d 635, 257 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1989), review denied, and ordered not to be
officially published by the California Supreme Court, July 13, 1989.
105. Id. at 641, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 442.




110. Id. at 638-39, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 440-41.
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him.'l Trial counsel's failure to object on Confrontation Clause grounds
to the admission of the alleged spontaneous exclamation became the basis
of the appeal. The state court of appeal concluded that the failure to
object to use of the statement did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel because such an objection would have been futile since the state-
ment did satisfy the requirements of confrontation." 2
In dicta, the court went on to state that any statement admitted
under the spontaneous exclamation exception automatically satisfies the
demands of confrontation. 1 3 The court reasoned that the exception
could be described as firmly rooted, and therefore did not mandate in-
quiry into the statement's reliability to satisfy the constitutional demands
of the Confrontation Clause.
1 1 4
The lower appellate court's decision in Maxwell" 5 cited the First
Circuit decision in Puleio v. Vose as support for its conclusions." 6 How-
ever, the Maxwell decision was based on a flawed interpretation of the
firmly rooted exception, since the California court made the same error
as the Puleio court in equating longevity with the concept of firmly
rooted."i
7
Additionally, and inconsistent with Puleio and Damon H., the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal in Maxwell concluded that "[a] court only needs
to satisfy itself" that a hearsay statement falls within the definition of a
firmly rooted exception in order to satisfy the requirements of confronta-
tion." 8 Thus, the court seems to have reached the conclusion that the
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of all statements falling
within a firmly rooted exception is conclusive.
The California Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition to
overturn the lower appellate court opinion." 9 However, the supreme
court, following a practice all but unique to California, ordered the lower
appellate court opinion removed from the official reporter system.'
20
111. Id. at 639, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
112. Id. at 645, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
113. Id. at 643, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
114. Id.
115. 209 Cal. App. 3d 635, 257 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1989).
116. Id. at 643-44, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 444 (citing Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1204-06 (1st
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1297 (1988)).
117. Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1204-06 (Ist Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1297
(1988); Maxwell, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 644, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
118. Maxwell, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 644, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
119. Maxwell, 209 Cal. App. 3d 635, 257 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1989), review denied, and ordered
not to be officially published by the California Supreme Court, July 13, 1989.
120. Id. The rules of several of the federal courts of appeals expressly preclude citation to
unpublished opinions as precedent. See 7TH CIR. R. 35(b)(2)(iv); 9TH CIR. R. 21(c); 10TH
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This process is known as "depublication."' 12 1
"Depublication is a procedure by which the high court simply erases
an opinion of the Court of Appeal from the books, with no explanation.
The result remains the same for the parties, but the case cannot be cited
as precedent in future cases."' 122 Former California Chief Justice Donald
Wright has commented that depublication is typically reserved for those
lower court opinions "in which the correct result has been reached by the
court of appeal but the opinion contains language which is an erroneous
statement of the law ....
For purposes of analysis and interpretation of the law, the Maxwell
court's use of this procedure is, at best, an ambiguous statement. Since
CIR. R. 36.3; FED. CIR. R. 18(a). The Oklahoma Supreme Court is given the power to desig-
nate which lower court opinions are to be published; in Colorado, Delaware and New Jersey,
committees make similar decisions. See Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publication of
Opinions in Federal and State Appellate Courts, 67 LAW LIB. J. 362, 367-74 (1974). For a
discussion of the weight to be accorded unpublished opinions, see Weaver, The Precedential
Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477 (1988). For a discussion of
the California depublication procedure, see Biggs, Censoring the Law in California: Decertifi-
cation Revisited, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1577, 1579 n.7 (1979); Kanner, The Unpublished Appellate
Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 387 (1973); Note, Decertification of Appellate Opin-
ion: The Need for Articulated Judicial Reasoning and Certain Precedent in California Law, 50
S. CAL. L. REv. 1181 (1977). Under the California Rules of Court, the courts of appeal decide
whether to publish a decision subject to the supreme court's decision to depublish. CAL. R, CT.
976(c)(I)-(2).
The "California Constitution has provided for publication of such opinions of the
supreme court and the courts of appeal 'as the Supreme Court may deem expedient' since
1904." Gerstein, "'Law by elimination:" depublication in the California Supreme Court, 67
JUDICATURE 293, 295 (1984).
121. "From 1909 until 1963, however, a statutory requirement that all opinions be pub-
lished was honored." Gerstein, supra note 120, at 295. In 1972, the California Supreme Court
modified Rule 976, shifting the presumption from publication to non-publication. Id. See also
Seligson & Warnlof, The Use of Unreported Cases in California, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 37, 44
(1972).
122. Uelmen, The Lucas Court is Suffocating; Worthy Cases are Lost in Crush of Death-
Penalty Reviews, L.A. Times, May 9, 1988, § B, at 7, col. 1.
123. See Note, supra note 120, at 1185 n.20.
Some have suggested that the reason for depublication is that when "the workload gets
too heavy, depublication is a shortcut that lets the court prune from case law what it perceives
to be the wrong reasons for the right decision." Cox, Inaction in Action in California, Nat'l
L.J., July 11, 1988, at 1, col. 1, cont'd at 24, col. 2. As noted by former California Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Grodin: "'Depublication is most frequently used when the court con-
siders the result to be correct, but regards a portion of the reasoning to be wrong and mislead-
ing.'" Uelmen, Depublication: The Court Makes Un-Cases, L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1989, § B,
at 7, col. 1 (quoting former California Supreme Court Justice Joseph Grodin). See also Mo-
rain, High Court Tactic: Depublished Cases Stir A Controversy, L.A. Times, Jan. 18, 1985, § B,
at 1, col. 1.
In 1971, the California Supreme Court depublished three cases. In 1987, the court depub-
lished 126 cases. This was a 43% increase over the previous year. Currently, 57% of the
criminal cases now delublished favor the defense. See Uelmen, supra note 122.
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such orders never set forth any grounds for the court's action, depublica-
tion provides no guidance as to what, if any, reasoning was unsound. As
a result, lawyers and courts may continue to make the same mistake, or
other mistakes, by misinterpreting the basis for the high court's
depublication.
Unfortunately, there are several plausible interpretations for the
depublication of Maxwell. First, the court may have believed that the
prosecution's use of the spontaneous exclamation was error, but harmless
to the outcome of the trial. Second, the court may have believed that
spontaneous exclamations should not be classified as firmly rooted, but
that the hearsay in this particular case was made under circumstances of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Third, the court may have
believed that spontaneous exclamations should be classified as firmly
rooted, but that this conclusion should be based upon a reliability, rather
than longevity, rationale. Fourth, the court may have believed that spon-
taneous exclamations should be classified as firmly rooted, but that the
presumption created by such classification should be rebuttable. Fifth,
the court may have believed that spontaneous exclamations should be
classified as firmly rooted, but that this conclusion should be based upon
a reliability, rather than longevity, rationale, and that the presumption
created by such classification should not be conclusive.
Thus, the depublication of the Maxwell decision leaves open the
question of whether the California Supreme Court agreed or disagreed
that the spontaneous exclamation exception should be classified as firmly
rooted. Why the court depublished the opinion, and whether this act
supplies any clue as to how the court will choose to rule when next faced
with the issue, is uncertain.
VII. CONCLUSION
Time should supply the answer to this riddle. However, before any
court reaches a conclusion as to the classification of spontaneous excla-
mations, it should first carefully consider that when the prosecution sub-
mits hearsay statements of an absent witness, the defendant is unable to
question that declarant. When all statements falling within a state-cre-
ated hearsay exception are classified as presumptively constitutional, the
defendant may not be in a position to effectively challenge the accusa-
tions. The lack of an opportunity to question hearsay witnesses will not
violate that defendant's constitutional rights in every case. However,
there are situations in which this inability may result in a denial of
confrontation.
Additionally, the presumptively constitutional nature of all state-
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ments falling within firmly rooted exceptions should be rebuttable. If the
presumption in favor of constitutionality is conclusive, then the defend-
ant may be prevented from constitutionally attacking an actual denial of
the right to confrontation.
Irrespective of whether the presumption is conclusive or not, excep-
tions should only be classified as firmly rooted with the greatest of care.
The elements which qualify a hearsay statement as a spontaneous excla-
mation fail to guarantee that virtually all such statements will be based
on personal knowledge and are not the product of either faulty recollec-
tion, or intentional or unintentional misrepresentation. 124 Thus, the re-
quirements for admission of a hearsay statement under this exception do
not realistically assure a substantial likelihood that virtually any state-
ment offered under the exception will be reliable enough to comport with
the constitutional mandates of the Confrontation Clause. The inherent
flaws in the rationale underlying the spontaneous exclamation exception
and the unreliability of spontaneous statements dictate that the exception
should not be classified as firmly rooted.
124. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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